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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF IRAQI OIL: HOW
THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM FITS IN, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Dawn Bell*
"The international oil system started out as a setup to
control a commodity, oil. Over the years and most re-
cently under the direction of the United States, that has
metamorphosed into a form of people control."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of oil in Iraq has led to two divergent conse-
quences. Oil has enhanced Iraq's wealth, resulting in an improved
quality of life; simultaneously it has heightened world-wide attention
on Iraq, resulting both in conflict and in an inability of Iraqis to shape
their own future absent international involvement. Before the discov-
ery of oil at the end of the nineteenth century, Iraq was economically
underdeveloped.2 Oil revenues have played a large role in changing
the economic, social and physical contours of the area. Mohamed Al-
mulhim, a renowned Iraqi political scientist, remarks that "amid a so-
ciety awakened, enlivened, and enriched by this sudden access of
wealth, [g]overnments could improve their social services, their
schools and colleges, hospitals, water-supply.., oil wealth could, and
did, open the door to higher standards of living."3 However, Almulhim
also recognizes that "the development of the oil resources in the Mid-
dle East has involved to an excessive degree the actual employment of
* J.D. University of Richmond School of Law, May 2005; B.A. University of Vir-
ginia, May 2002. The author would like to sincerely thank all of the staff of the
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business, her family, and her husband, Ja-
son Williams, for their help and support.
1 STEPHEN PELLETIERE, IRAQ AND THE INTERNATION.AL OIL SYSTENI: WHY AMERICA
WENT TO WAR IN THE GuLF 223-24 (2001).
2 MOHAMED BIN ABDUL LATIF B N MOHAMED ALMU-LHrM, MIDDLE EAST Om.: A RE-
DISTRL-rION OF VALTs AmSG FROM THE OILINDUsTRY 26 (1991) (quoting STE-
PHEN LONGRIGG, OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAsT: ITs DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT (2d
ed. 1961)).
' Id. at 46. See also PETER R. ODELL, OIL AND WORLD POWER (7th ed. 1983). Odell
remarks that the discovery of oil "has certainly produced a different Middle East
from that which would otherwise have emerged." Id. at 186.
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the military strategy by the home governments" of the large oil
companies.4
Section II of this comment is dedicated to understanding the
history of Iraq's position in this international power struggle. Section
III focuses on the Oil-for-Food Program implemented by the United
Nations (U.N.), and Section IV interprets how the Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram fits into the historical scheme of Iraq.
II. HISTORY
A. Through a Clear Lens
Modern Iraq was born from the declining Ottoman Empire. By
the latter half of the nineteenth century, Britain had advanced into
southern Iraq, stabilizing its position during World War IL' One
scholar theorizes that British involvement in Iraq during the War re-
sulted from a desire to exploit oil resources. "A big question about
World War I is why the Allies devoted so much time and resources to
waging the fight in the Middle East.... [OInly one explanation carries
weight, that the British were determined to take control of the area
because of its oil."6
According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, Great Britain
retained control of southern Mesopotamia, thus consolidating its posi-
tion in Iraq.7 Britain gained complete control of Iraq in 1920 after a
meeting at San Remo.' The Iraqi people reacted violently to this news;
consequently, military rule was put in place until October 1920. Iraq
gained independence in 1932, but Britain retained vestiges of control
through a twenty-five year treaty giving it the right to maintain mili-
4 ALMULHIM, supra note 2, at 42.
5 LORENZO KENT KIMBALL, THE CHANGING PATTERN OF POLITICAL POWER IN IRAQ,
1958 TO 1971, at 54-55 (1972). See MARIAN KENT, OIL AND EMPIRE: BRITISH POLICY
AND MESOPOTAMIAN OIL 1900 - 1920 (1976) (discussing Britain's historical interest
in Iraq and Iraqi oil).
6 PELLETIERE, supra note 1, at 29. See generally JOHN BACHER, PETROTYRANNY
(2000). Bacher argues that the presence of oil wealth also caused the Europeans to
cling to their empires in the Middle East after the end of the War. Id. at 31. He
notes that new states in other parts of the British Empire, such as the West Indies
and India, were developing systems of democratic self-government. In contrast,
the British did not encourage the development of a democratic system in the Mid-
dle East, but rather fostered autocracy in order to retain vital oil supplies. Id. at
49.
7 KIMBALL, supra note 5, at 55.
8 Id. at 56.
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tary bases in Iraq and an Iraqi monarchy that was receptive to British
wishes.'
The monarchy was overthrown in 1958, and a period of pro-
longed tension began, both within the country and in Iraq's relation-
ship with other countries. Between 1958 and 1968, the leadership of
the country changed hands four times.' ° Following the Baathist take-
over in 1968, Iraq achieved some political stability. Saddam Hussein
became President of Iraq, Secretary-General of the Party, and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces in 1979.11
In the 1980's, a gruesome war between Iran and Iraq ensued.
The conflict resulted in over 800,000 deaths, more than one million
displaced people, and the intentional destruction of Iraq's infrastruc-
ture. 2 After a brief period of peace, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Al-
though the conflict lasted only a few days, the repercussions would be
felt well into the next two decades - partially through U.N. Security
Council sanctions. The Kuwait invasion and U.N. intervention precip-
itated a United States-led attack on Iraq in March 2003. As a result of
the attack, the Coalition Provisional Authority now controls the coun-
try, the sanctions have been retracted, and the Oil-for-Food Program
has been dissolved.
B. Through the Oily Film
The oil industry is the world's largest industry. It plays an im-
portant role in international trade because of the physical separation
of producing countries from regions of consumption.' 3 Consequently,
the industry is intertwined with global political relationships. From
its inception, the oil industry in the Middle East has been operated
almost exclusively by foreign investors. Of the seven largest oil com-
panies, at least five have their headquarters, their top management,
and the majority of their shareholders in the United States.1 4
9 ABBAS ALN-SRAWI, THE ECONOMY OF IRAQ: OIL, WARs, DESTRUCTION OF DEVELOP-
M-E*NT AND PROSPECTS, 1950-2010, at 128 (1994).
10 Adeed Dawisha, The Politics of War: Presidential Centrality, Party Power, Polit-
ical Opposition, in IRAQ L, TR-A-NsITIoN: A PoLIrICAL, Eco_;o.Inc, AND STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVE 21, 22 (Frederick W. Axelgard ed., 1986).
1 Id. at 23.
12 BAcHER, supra note 6, at 56.
13 ODELL, supra note 3, at 11.
14 ALnrLImm, supra note 2, at 14. Of the seven predominant international compa-
nies, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California,
Socony-Mobil Oil Company, Inc., Gulf Oil Corporation, and the Texas Company
are American companies. The other two, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., and
the Royal Dutch-Shell group are British and Dutch.
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Iraqi oil first became a concern of the major international ac-
tors15 in the years immediately preceding World War 1.16 The Otto-
man Empire first demonstrated its interest when the Turkish Caliph
acquired ownership of the oil.' 7 Germany then secured the formation
of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway."8 According to the agreement, the
Germans were able to exploit minerals for up to twenty kilometers on
either side of the railroad tracks. 9 The construction of the railroad
commenced in 1904, but the Ottoman Empire experienced a revolt in
1908 and the railway project ended.2 ° The Germans tried to revive the
deal by transferring their interests to the Turkish Petroleum Company
(TPC) in 1913.21
The TPC was established to acquire rights in Iraqi oil, and
though it was initially granted the authority to exploit a limited
amount of oil, following the outbreak of World War I the company tem-
porarily ceased operations. 22 In 1925, Iraq finally granted the conces-
sion to the TPC, which then changed its name to the Iraqi Petroleum
Company (IPC).23 The IPC is owned by five large international com-
panies: the British Petroleum Company, the Royal Dutch-Shell Group,
the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, Standard Oil of New Jersey
and the Socony Mobil Oil Company.2 4
According to the terms of the original concession, Iraq was to
receive 10% of the profits of the company that would be formed to ex-
ploit the oil. 25 When the Americans became party to the agreement,
however, they wanted the IPC to be a non-profit organization. The oil
companies would not sell the crude oil in the open market, but would
pass it through their own refineries. 26 The Iraqis were not pleased
with this determination-a ten percent profit share is a meaningless
term to a non-profit organization.2 7 Ultimately Iraq simply received
royalties based on the volume of exported oil and had no voice in gov-
15 Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire.
16 ALMULiM, supra note 2, at 135. For a discussion of the concession system,
nationalization, and the role of the oil sector in the Iraqi economy, see KADHIM A.
AL-EYD, OIL REVENUES AND ACCELERATED GRoWTH: ABsoRPTIvE CAPACITY IN IRAQ
10-40 (1979).
17 ODELL, supra note 3, at 31.
18 PELLETIERE, supra note 1, at 25.
'9 Id. at 24-26.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 26.
22 ALMULHIM, supra note 2, at 145.
23 Id. at 144.
24 Id. at 17 n.25.
25 PELLETIERE, supra note 1, at 65.
26 Id. at 65-66.
27 Id. at 66.
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erning the companies. 28 The concession system not only put Iraq in a
position of being unable to fully exploit its resources, but it also placed
the country at the mercy of decisions made by outside investors. The
foreign companies were insulated from the local economy, and as a re-
sult, they determined output by considering international, instead of
local, conditions.
Following a revolution in 1958, Abdul Qarim Qasim became
the leader of the Iraqi nation.29 He expressed to the IPC his desire for
20% participation in the company and the rights to the acreage that
had not been exploited.30 Even though the two sides engaged in exten-
sive discussion, negotiations broke down after Qasim increased the
percentage of dues that Iraq received from exported oil.3 ' In retalia-
tion, Qasim published Public Law 80 on December 11, 1961, which re-
tracted the rights to 95% of the land that had not been exploited by the
companies.3 2 A coup instigated by the Baath party in 1963 resulted in
the death of Qasim and the ascendancy of Abdul Aref, who designed a
scheme to develop all of the land appropriated by Public Law 80
through the Iraqi National Oil Company.3 3 In 1968, the Baath party
staged another coup, and subsequently implemented Arefs scheme.3 4
The government in place was also able to work out an arrangement
with Russia whereby the Soviet countries exchanged their expertise
for Iraqi oil.3"
The changes in Iraq's oil policies were indicative of a larger
global trend. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was formed on September 14, 1960, in an effort by five coun-
tries to enhance their bargaining power by standing together.3 6 The
countries believed that by adhering to policies as a group, they would
prevent the oil companies from playing one country off another.3" In
1973, OPEC was able to implement this plan and take advantage of a
tight supply situation, creating the oil crises of 1973 and 1974.
The realization by oil-producing countries of their potential in-
fluence in the global stage was not solely manifested in the formation
of OPEC. The Middle Eastern countries used oil as a "weapon" during
28 Id. at 67.
29 Id. at 124.
30 Id. at 126.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 127.
33 Id. at 132, 134. See KMBA L, supra note 5, at 108-18.
3 PELLETIERE, supra note 1, at 135.
35 id.
36 AL-miHI, supra note 2, at 76. The first meeting of OPEC was an assembly of
representatives from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Id.
37 ODELL, supra note 3, at 21.
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the Suez War of 1956, significantly affecting the global economy.38
However, by the Six Day War of 1967, the Middle Eastern countries
seemed to have abandoned their earlier approach. 39 A new strategy of
supporting various causes with money from the oil industry
emerged.4" This development helped build regional cohesion and
strengthened prevailing ideologies.
Iraq was experiencing inner turmoil while these worldwide
events were occurring. It was not until 1968 that the political climate
of Iraq stabilized under the Baath Party's leadership, notwithstanding
the fact that the regime was soon to become a dictatorship.4 1 Some
academics argue that oil profits were a motivating factor in the evolu-
tion of Iraq into a dictatorship. Modern dictatorships in oil-producing
countries have similar characteristics: oil provides an abundant form
of wealth for repressive governments, because the income is not ob-
tained through taxation; and independent labor movements, which
have been critical in crushing despotism in many states, can be easily
bought off with the surplus profits.4 2
With a somewhat stable government and reassurance of its
power in the international realm, Iraq aimed its policy in the 1970's at
"industrial diversification, agricultural self-sufficien[cyl, infrastruc-
tural development, and improvements in social services and education,
while attempting to move away from an oil-based economy. ' '43 Regard-
ing oil, the Iraqi government took back much of the land the country
had previously given to the IPC, and expanded the activities of the
Iraqi National Oil Company.4 4
Much of the internal growth that had occurred during the
1970's ground to a halt with the commencement of the war with Iran.
Oil was a motivating factor in much of the damage done in this con-
flict. A tanker war began in 1984, damaging shipping oil, and many
38 Id. at 22.
39 Id. at 194. Odell notes that "the Middle Eastern oil-producing nations appeared
by 1967 to have made up their minds that, in both the short and the long term,
they themselves were likely to suffer the most from simply holding the world ran-
som over oil." Id.40 Id. at 194-95.
41 KIMBALL, supra note 5, at 144-61. For a discussion of the stability of the period,
see Dawisha, supra note 10, at 21-32.
42 BACHER, supra note 6, at 20 (remarking that independent labor movements
have overturned dictatorships in such countries as Poland and South Africa, and
citing the Congo, Brunei, Angola, and many of the Middle Eastern Countries as
remaining 'havens' of dictatorship).
43 Jonathan Crusoe, Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?, in IRAQ IN
TRANSITION: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 33, 39 (Freder-
ick W. Axelgard ed., 1986).
44 ODELL, supra note 3, at 94.
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attacks focused on the pipeline facilities of the opposing country. 45
The international community began to perceive Iraq as a threat to
global security soon after the hostilities began between Iran and
Iraq.4'
International tolerance, which had been thinning throughout
the Iran-Iraq conflict, came to an abrupt end when Iraq invaded Ku-
wait in August 1990. The invasion resulted in the First Persian Gulf
War and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.N. Security
Council. 4 ' During the Gulf War, Iraq was bombed for six weeks, and
the U.N. mission reported that "[t]he recent conflict had wrought near-
apocalyptic results upon what had been, until January 1991, a rather
highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of mod-
ern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has,
for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age."' 8 Tur-
moil has since increased, and Iraq refused to let the U.N. weapons in-
spectors back into the country in 1998." The United States attempted
to coerce Baghdad into allowing the inspectors to return by conducting
over six hundred strikes against more than one hundred targets be-
tween December 15 and 19, 1998.50
The Iraqi government launched a campaign in 1999 to increase
the production of aging oil fields, so as to compensate for their declin-
ing capacity. 5 ' Iraqi authorities warned foreign investors that they
would lose their fields unless they disregarded the sanctions regime.
In 2001, Iraq followed through on its threat and began developing a
"5 Frederick W. Axelgard, War and Oil: Implications for Iraq's Postwar Role in
Gulf Securitv. in IRAQ [N TRm--sMoN: A POLrIICAL, Eco,oMIc, AND STRATEGIC PER-
SPECTrVE 1, 3 (Frederick W. Axelgard ed., 1986).
'5 See, e.g., Danielle L. Simmons, Book Note, Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact
of Sanctions and War, 25 SU-FFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 275, 279 (2001).
" Id. at 280. Resolution 661 established sanctions, and Resolution 687 formu-
lated additional requirements that Iraq must meet for the United Nations to lift
the sanctions are lifted.
"s ALAsawi, supra note 9, at 119 (quoting The Report to the Secretan. General
on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environ-
ment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Matti Ahtisaari, Under Secretary-Gen-
eral for Administration and Management, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc
S/22366 (1991;, available at http-J/www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reports/
s22366.pdf).
49 Steven Montgomery, Iraq: The World Community's Response to a Troubled Na-
tion, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hui. RTS. 507. 507-08 (2002).
50 Michael L. Cornell, Comment, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of
United Nations Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,
16 Com. J. INr'L L. 325, 339 (2001).
51 Valerie Marcel, Briefing Paper, The Future of Oil in Iraq: Scenarios and Impli-
cations, ROYAL LNST. L,-r'L AFF., SUSTAINABLE DEv. PRoGRAM 5 (December 2002).
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large southern oilfield, which was promised to a foreign company. 52
Iraqi authorities have awarded twelve-year contracts to some oil com-
panies so that they could immediately resume work once sanctions
were lifted.5"
As a result of growing uneasiness with the harsh treatment of
Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted "smart sanctions" in 2002." 4
If an item is on the review list, then the product can only be imported
if weapons inspectors decided that the item would not be used for mili-
tary purposes.5 5 A good could brought into Iraq without U.N. scrutiny
if it was on the list.56
Recent events in Iraq are certain to change its outlook for the
future. On March 18, 2003, the United States bombed Baghdad, trig-
gering a war with Iraq. Two months later, on May 22, 2003, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1483, which lifted civilian sanc-
tions and provides for the termination of the Oil-for-Food Program and




Following the Gulf War, the Secretary-General of the U.N. dis-
patched a mission to assess the humanitarian needs in Iraq.58 Reports
from that mission predicted dire consequences if humanitarian needs
were not immediately addressed. In response, the U.N. proposed that
Iraq sell oil for the requisite goods listed in Resolution 706." 9 Iraq ini-
tially refused the proposals, claiming, "the system planned for moni-
toring the distribution of humanitarian goods would constitute a
violation of its sovereignty."60 Finally, on April 14, 1995, Iraq ex-
52 Id.
53 Id. at 5-6.
54 Allison Ehlert, Note, Between Empire and Community: The United States and
Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Minimum Public Order:
Iraq: At the Apex of Evil, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 731, 738 (2003).55 Id. The review list itemizes products that could be used to construct weapons,
and spans over three hundred pages.
56 Id.
67 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.SCOR, 57th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1483 (2003).
58 Montgomery, supra note 49, at 508.
59 Id. See S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. S1
RES/0706 (1991).
60 Erica Cosgrove, The Sanctions Dilemma and the Case of Iraq: Human Rights
and Humanitarian Challenges to the Use of Multilateral Economic Sanctions, 9
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & Soc. IssuEs 65, 88 (1999).
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pressed its willingness to participate in the Program and the U.N. Se-
curity Council established the Oil-for-Food Program with Resolution
986.61 The Program was meant to be a temporary solution until the
Iraqi government complied with the earlier Resolutions.6 2 It was not
until 1996, however, that the Iraqi government and the U.N. were able
to come to an agreement, entitled the Memorandum of Understand-
ing.63 In December 1996, the first oil was shipped out of the country.'
The food from these early efforts began arriving in the spring of
1997.65 The Program ran in "phases" of 180 days. and the U.N. Secur-
ity Council had to approve of the Program anew each time the previous
phase ended.6 6
Initially, there was a cap on the amount of oil that Iraq could
sell. At first, it was limited to $2 billion worth of oil every six months,
raised to $5.26 billion in 1998, and, finally, the ceiling was dropped in
1999.67 Originally, 66% of the revenues were allocated to the humani-
tarian program and the Compensation Commission received 30% .68
This allocation was lowered to 25% in 2000 because of humanitarian
concerns.69 The proceeds from the Program are kept in a U.N. escrow
account, and though the government brokers the deals, the money is
only used to buy items that have U.N. approval.7 0 While most of the
funds are used to obtain food, the U.N. also encourages the purchase of
goods that benefit infrastructure and telecommunications.
With the onset of the Second Persian Gulf War, the Security
Council modified the Oil-for-Food Program in accordance with Resolu-
tion 1472, giving the Secretary-General the authority to address the
current humanitarian needs. 71 Prior to the cessation of that author-
61 Office of the Iraq Programme, About the Programme, at http/www.un.org/






6 Office of the Iraq Programme, Phases of the Programme, at http//www.un.org/
Depts/oip/background/phases.htmI (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
67 About the Programme, supra note 61.
68 Meredith DuBarry Huston, Comment, Wartime Environmental Damages: Fi-
nancing the Cleanup, 23 U. PA. J. LT'L Eco-,. L. 899, 916 (2002).
69 Id. at 916-17 1-By November 15th, 2001, the Commission had awarded nearly
814 trillion in compensation to 1,506,458 claimants").
71 John B. Judis, Crude Calculus: Why Iraq Still Needs Oil-for-Food, NEW REPtB-
uc. May 19, 2003, at 14.
71 Office of the Iraq Programme, Implementation of Oil-for-Food: A Chronology, at
http.//www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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ity, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483.72 This new
Resolution declared an end to sanctions, gave Iraq the ability to re-
sume oil exports, and heralded the nearing end of the Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram.7 3 In addition, the responsibility for the Program would transfer
to the administration set in place by the occupying powers.7 4
Since the adoption of Resolution 1483, U.N. personnel have la-
bored diligently to ensure that the transition proceeds smoothly, but
they work in a dangerous environment. On August 19, 2003, Sergio
Vieira de Mello, the special representative of the Secretary-General,
was killed, along with at least twenty-three others, when suicide
bombers drove into the U.N. compound in Baghdad.7 5 In addition,
eighty-six other workers had to be airlifted out of the country to re-
ceive medical attention.7 6 The outbreak of violence has prompted
members of the U.N. Security Council to demand an accelerated time
schedule for surrender of the Coalition Provisional Authority's control
in Iraq. The deputy ambassador from France expressed his desire that"one must give back to the Iraqis their sovereignty within the frame-
work of an accelerated timetable and clear sequence of events." 7 A
number of U.N. members echoed these statements.78
B. Impacts
The Oil-for-Food Program is the largest assistance program in
the world, in terms of its dollar value, and it has been one of the princi-
pal activities of the U.N. in recent years.7 9 Most commentators, while
recognizing the success of the Program, emphasize its inability to alle-
viate the widespread suffering caused by the sanctions8 0 Although
the Oil-for-Food Program has made a difference in the everyday lives
72 Id.
73 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 57, at 4, 6.
74 Id.
75 Envoy Gets Sad Farewell in Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Killed in Basra, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 24, 2003, at C4.
76 Id.
77 Coalition Partners Brief Security Council on Situation in Iraq, Calling for
Stepped up International Involvement, Enhanced Security, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4812d mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/7851 (2003) [hereinafter Security Council Briefing], at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7851.doc.htm.
78 Id.
79 Richard Garfield, Health and Well-Being in Iraq: Sanctions and the Impact of
the Oil-for-Food Program, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 278 (2001).
80 See, e.g., id.
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF IRAQI OIL
of Iraqis, it was not meant to be a substitute for the normal economic
activity of a nation.81
As a result of the Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq has received $28
billion in humanitarian supplies and equipment.8 2 With the Program
providing such an abundant and accessible influx of resources, Sad-
dam Hussein recognized an opportunity to pirate its potential wealth
for personal gain. Reports emerged stating that his regime demanded
kickbacks from purchasers and bought most of its goods from countries
whose support it sought.s In addition, some evidence exists that Iraq
was able to develop weapons of mass destruction by purchasing chemi-
cals bought through the Oil-for-Food Program. 4
Despite possible advantages to the Iraqi government, there
was a serious reduction in communicable diseases and malnutrition
because of the Oil-for-Food Program." The Program also aided in ag-
riculture, energy, construction, education, and transportation. 6 Food
production. as well as overall nutritional value, increased under the
Program." The improved access to food and the increased quality of
the available food led to a decrease in malnutrition.s Visits to hospi-
tals and medical centers increased, because the equipment in the cen-
ters and the transportation to the hospitals improved.8 9 The amount
of safe drinking water and electricity also rose.90
In a recent report on the Oil-for-Food Program, the Secretary-
General of the U.N. maintained an optimistic tone. He highlighted
major improvements, but along with each success, there was the un-
dertone of inadequacy. For example, when the Secretary-General dis-
cussed water treatment, he stated that the purity and availability of
drinkable water had increased tremendously. 91 However, the water-
treatment facilities require a constant supply of spare parts, which
81 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolutions 1447 (2002), 1472
'2003' and 1476 (2003), U.N.SCOR, 57th Sess., at 26, U.N. Doc. A/S/576 (2003)
[hereinafter Secretary-General's May 2003 Report].
82 About the Programme, supra note 61.
" Judis, supra note 70. Judis notes that most of the goods were bought from Rus-
sia, France, and other Middle Eastern countries.
84 Jamie Dettmer, U.N. Aid Feeds Iraqi Weapons Program: A Department of En-
ergy Report Reveals that Saddam Hussein is Exploiting the U.N. Oil-for-Food Pro-
gram to Enhance His Weapons-Of-Mass-Destruction Capabilities, L,-sIGHr ON THE
NEWS, Dec. 31, 2001, at 25.
s' Secretary-General's May 2003 Report, supra note 81, at 14.
s Garfield, supra note 79, at 280.
87 Id. at 284.
" Id. at 285.
89 Id. at 286-87.
o Secretary-General's May 2003 Report, supra note 81, at 16-20.
91 Id.
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often do not correspond to specifications because they must be pur-
chased from local dealers.9 2 In addition, educational supplies have im-
proved the quality of education, but at the same time, there are many
supplies that remain unusable because their complementary parts
have not arrived. 3 Desks worth sixteen million dollars sit in a ware-
house, awaiting their steel legs.9 4 In his closing statement, the Secre-
tary-General made the following plea: "I should like to appeal to all
concerned to give absolute priority to the interests of the Iraqi people,
who have suffered far too long. All necessary measures should be
taken to normalize life for the Iraqi population."9 5
The Oil-for-Food Program was severely affected by the onset of
the Second Persian Gulf War.96 There was a substantial funding
shortage, and the international staff withdrew from the country, caus-
ing a temporary suspension of the Program on March 17, 2003. 9 7 The
system's infrastructure was also badly damaged. Hospitals were
looted, vaccines became ineffective because of power outages, and the
public distribution of food and drugs were disrupted. In addition,
the suspension of the Program had a negative effect on the economy.
The Secretary-General reflects that the Program "had generated a
host of economic activities, including employment, and provided a rev-
enue base for local administration. Its suspension meant that local
contractors executing the projects had to lay off their workers."9 9
According to Resolution 1483, the Oil-for-Food Program is to
terminate in the fall of 2003. The Secretary-General affirms that pro-
gress is being made toward that goal and that the food-distribution
mechanisms are back in operation.' 0 0 However, in his report, he
paints a grim picture of the situation in Iraq because of the conflict
and the termination of the Oil-for-Food Program. He remarks that the
lack of security fundamentally affects everyday life, because it hinders
freedom of movement, economic and legal reform, and the develop-
ment of an independent media.' 0 ' The health care system is operating
92 Id. at 16.
93 Id. at 21.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 27.
96 Secretary-General's May 2003 Report, supra note 81, at 1-3.
9' Id. at 2.
98 Id. at 3.
99 Id. at 3.
1oo Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council
Resolution 1483 (2003), U.N.SCOR, 57th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/2003/715 (2003)
[hereinafter Secretary-General's July 2003 Report].
'01 Id. at 6.
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at a fraction of its pre-war capacity, water treatment continues to be
an issue, and electrical plants have been sabotaged.1 0 2
The two reports of the Secretary-General make it clear that de-
spite the advances made as a result of the Oil-for-Food Program, the
Iraqi people are still in dire straights. Recent reports indicate that
sixty percent of all Iraqi factories are closed, unemployment and pov-
erty affect half the population, and nearly 20-c of Iraqis live in extreme
poverty. 0 3 Chronic malnutrition affects up to 25% of the population
in some portions of the country."' As a result, -Iraq, which had been
a country that provided an average standard of living by regional stan-
dards, has now become a country with substandard conditions in the
economy, infrastructure, health care, education, standard of living for
children."105
IV. ANALYSIS
A Did Oil-for-Food Enhance the Legitimacy of Sanctions?
The sanction regime has been severely condemned. One focus
of the criticism is the legality of the sanctions as they applied to Iraq.
After 1996, the Oil-for-Food Program, in part, mediated the effects of
the sanctions regime. The Program, because it alleviated the suffering
of the Iraqi people, calls into the question the arguments against the
international legality of sanctions against Iraq.
The United Nations authorizes the use of sanctions in Article
41 of the U.N. Charter in order to penalize nations that are guilty of
international law violations."° Further, U.N. Resolution 687 autho-
rizes the use of drastic means to prevent Iraqi violations of interna-
tional law. 10 7
The determination of whether the sanctions against Iraq are
legal depends on the interpretation given to the U.N. Charter. Article
24(2) of the Charter provides that the Security Council must act con-
sistently with the principles and purposes of the U.N., but this leaves
room for interpretation.10 8 While the Preamble lists preventing war
and reaffirming human rights as important objectives, Chapter One
lists guarding international peace and security as the first purpose of
102 Id. at 13.
103 Garfield, supra note 79, at 279-tf1.
104 Office of the Iraq Programme, A Fact Sheet. at httpJ/www.un.orgiDepts/oip/
background/fact-sheet.htnml (last updated Sept. 23. 2003).
105 Montgomery, supra note 49, at 509.
106 Simmons, supra note 46, at 281. See U.N. CHARTER art. 41, available at httpi/
www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
107 S.C. Res. 687, U.N.SCOR, 46th Sess.. 2981st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
108 Cosgrove, supra note 60, at 69-70.
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the U.N.' ° 9 If these purposes are viewed as equally important, then it
is arguably the case that the sanctions' failure to promote human
rights is in direct conflict with the Charter.
Another argument against the legality of sanctions is that they
do not follow the international law theory of proportionality."' This
principle requires that the use of force be in proportion to the initial
violation. Although Iraq invaded Kuwait and used dangerous types of
warfare in the Iranian conflict, the Iraqis were militarily "punished" in
the Gulf War and at various other points during the 1990's. In addi-
tion, the U.N. destroyed many of their weapons of mass destruction,
while the sanctions left Iraq without sufficient resources to rebuild its
military strength."'
More tenuous is the argument that the laws of war apply to the
use of economic sanctions. These laws prohibit a country from starv-
ing civilians and causing a humanitarian disaster during a time of
war." 2 By implication, since sanctions are part of a war strategy, the
laws of war would prohibit such action during the imposition of
sanctions. 1 3
The Oil-for-Food Program potentially affects each of these
three analyses. The first argument hinges on the logic that because
the U.N. is not respecting the rights of the Iraqi people, sanctions are
discordant with the U.N. Charter. By carrying out the Oil-for-Food
scheme, however, the U.N. shows concern for the rights and the needs
of the Iraqi people." 4
The Oil-for-Food Program also tips the scales in the proportion-
ality analysis. According to the proportionality theory, the U.N.'s reac-
tion is excessively harsh in comparison to Iraq's actions; consequently,
the outcome is so unfair as to be unlawful." 5 The Program softens the
edge to the U.N.'s actions, though, to make them seem less harsh. Fi-
109 U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para.
3, available at http://www.un.orglaboutun/charter/.
110 Cornell, supra note 50, at 328.
111 See id.
112 See Cosgrove, supra note 60.
113 Id. at 73. Cosgrove states that "many of the rules contained in the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols reflect the principle that if a population is
not receiving adequate food and supplies, humanitarian action must be taken or
permitted as quickly as possible." Id.114 See, e.g., id.
115 Cornell, supra note 50, at 349-51. He notes that "any exercise of force under
the U.N. Charter must conform to the common law requirement that the force be
proportionate to the aggression or threat to which it is aimed at deterring." Id. at
349. Even without the mediating effect of the Oil-for-Food Program, though, Cor-
nell theorizes that the sanctions may be proportionate to Hussein's ability to kill
thousands of people with weapons of mass destruction.
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nally, according to the "laws of war" analysis, the sanctions are in vio-
lation of international law because they starve civilians and cause
humanitarian complications." 6 Although the Oil-for-Food Program
has not eradicated the humanitarian problems in Iraq, it has certainly
ensured that more Iraqis were fed and have had their basic needs ful-
filled. Therefore, if the sanctions are analyzed along with the Oil-for-
Food Program, it is less likely that the U.N.'s actions will be found in
violation of international law.
B. How does Oil-for-Food Fit into the Historical Framework?
Second only to Saudi Arabia, Iraq's confirmed oil reserves
stand at more than 112 billion barrels."' 7 Some estimates put the
amount of possible total reserves at more than 215 billion barrels.11 8
Combined with one of the lowest per-barrel production costs in the
world, each barrel of crude oil in Iraq costs less than one U.S. dollar." 9
Consequently, Iraqi oil has been the focus of international attention
and has largely been subject to the control of foreign companies and
states.
Before the sanction regime, Iraqi oil was often under the do-
minion of other states. Many analysts posit that oil is the cause of the
current conflict between Iraq, the United States and Great Britain.
Musa Ja'far asks, "Had it not been for oil, would the United States go
out of its way and spend billions of greenbacks at its own cost to 'liber-
ate' the Iraqi people?" 20 This worldwide skepticism has grown upon
reports of the failure to find weapons of mass destruction and with the
appointment of an American to supervise the restoration of Iraq's oil
industry.12 1
How then does the Oil-for-Food Program fit into the historical
scramble to control Iraqi oil? It is clear that the Iraqi government
viewed the Program as impinging on their sovereignty and voiced their
opposition a number of times. The first indication that Hussein's re-
gime was opposed to the Oil-for-Food Program was in the govern-
ment's complete rejection of the Program for five years. 12 2
116 See Cosgrove, supra note 60, at 72-73.
117 Gawdat Bahgat. Oil Diplomacy: American Policy in the Persian Gulf, 24
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. J. 143, 156 (2000).
118 Id.
119 Musa Ja'far, News Analysis: Iraq's Oil Wealth, A Grace or a Curse?, XI-N A
NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55566121.
120 Id.
121 Judis, supra note 70, at 14. See also Elizabeth Sullivan, Clarifying Murky Mo-
tives in Iraq, PLAIN DEALER, June 29, 2003, at H5 (noting the discrepancies in the
United States' reasons for commencing a war and its subsequent actions).
122 Cosgrove, supra note 60, at 86.
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Additionally, in 1998, the Iraqi government threatened weapons in-
spectors whose presence was paid for by funds from the Program.' 2 3
Under the Program, the oil was transported into Turkey,
where it was delivered to those countries that had contracts with
Iraq.'2 4 While Iraq could choose, to some extent, which countries to
bargain with, the contracts still had to be approved by the U.N. The
revenue gained from these transactions was placed in an escrow ac-
count and used to purchase necessities, which were also subject to
U.N. scrutiny.1 25
Prior to the instatement of sanctions against Iraq, the large in-
ternational oil companies had lost much of their ability to manipulate
oil producing nations as a result of nationalization in the 1950's and
OPEC's rise to power in the 1970's and 1980's.26 Through the Oil-for-
Food Program, the international community has regained some sem-
blance of control, due to their ability to monitor the export of oil from
Iraq and the import of goods into the country.
In addition, the imposition of sanctions can be seen as "punish-
ment" for Iraq's earlier attempts to gain control of its oil fields. The
sanctions also acted as a warning to other Middle Eastern countries to
appease the oil companies, lest they be treated in a similar fashion.
Stephen Pelletiere posits that the harsh response of the international
community is a consequence of Iraq's attempts to free itself from the
oil companies' power in the middle of the century. 2 7 Iraq was "sure to
be punished by the oilmen; they could never forgive it for doing what it
did. Baghdad had not only taken something that the oilmen believed
was theirs by right" but had also turned to Communist countries to get
aid.'"2 Pelletiere continues, "Iraq's coup of nationalizing the IPC fields
became a factor later on in precipitating the confrontation with the
United States.' 2 9
Although the policy of isolation and control has been in place
for over ten years, it came into disfavor with much of the world com-
munity because of the humanitarian tragedy playing out in Iraq. A
policy that isolates the country from the world at large by cutting the
citizens off from new modes of thinking, the latest technical material,
and a global network, is dangerous. 3 ° The sanctions, and the U.N.'s
123 See Montgomery, supra note 49.
124 Id. at 509.
125 Id.
126 See Section II, supra.
127 PELLETIERE, supra note 1, at 142.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 143.
130 Denis J. Halliday, The Impact of the U.N. Sanctions on the People of Iraq, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1999, at 29 (1999). Halliday served as the Assistant Sec-
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patronizing attempts to take care of the Iraqi people through the Oil-
for-Food Program, foster feelings of humiliation and anger, which are
not conducive to international peace. Further, "without the benefits of
overseas travel and exposure to foreign information and ideas, the
next generation of Iraqis, including the next generation of leadership,
may become isolationist, introverted, and defensive."''
The Oil-for-Food Program allowed other countries to maintain
control of Iraqi oil and the sanctions regime served the goal of retribu-
tion. These objectives are no longer desirable, if they ever were. Iraqis
are stifled and starved at the expense of the large oil companies' sense
of security. While this may have been tolerable under the system of
concessions, the international community has made clear that it is no
longer acceptable.
C. Post-conflict, What Does the Future Hold for Iraq?
The U.N. Security Council's Resolution 1483 announced the
end of the Oil-for-Food Program and the transfer of the vestiges of the
Program to the Coalition Provisional Authority. In light of the past
conflict, which resulted from controlling Iraq's oil supply, the United
States, Great Britain, and any other countries taking responsibility for
rebuilding Iraq should tread carefully.
Until the development of a stable government, a program simi-
lar to that of Oil-for-Food should continue to operate.' 3 2 The United
States and Great Britain need a similar program to provide food to the
Iraqi population, to legitimate their presence, and to prevent other
countries from acquiring Iraqi oil revenues through lawsuits.' 3 The
Program has many valuable food-distribution mechanisms, which
could be used by the new government to distribute goods and food.'3 4
In addition, one of the most important reasons to keep a similar pro-
gram is to avoid a financial nightmare: "[u]nder the U.N. program, the
countries, companies, and individuals to which Saddam owes almost
$400 billion in debts, Gulf war compensation, and pending contracts-
a list that includes Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia-are prevented
from making claims on Iraq's oil revenues to recoup the money owed to
them." 13 5
Although companies will be able to freely invest and purchase
Iraqi oil, in all likelihood, that investment will be slow, and oil prices
retary-General of the U.N. until his resignation in 1998, and he served as the U.N.
humanitarian coordinator of the Oil-for-Food Program for a year.
131 Id.
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may be low, because of the perceived risk of instability in the country.
Because the U.N. administered Oil-for-Food, it was relatively safe to
enter into agreements with Iraq. This absence of risk, now gone, was
worth a price premium.' 3 6 In addition, although more countries are
able to negotiate with Iraq for investment and production deals, they
may hesitate to establish a presence in a country where the future is
continually shifting. Therefore, it is imperative for the new govern-
ment to stabilize immediately and project an image of assurance.
The people of Iraq and the international community call for a
hastened timeline for the Coalition Provisional Authority's relinquish-
ment of authority.'3 7 However, the Secretary-General reports that
getting the assets and the contracts from the Oil-for-Food Program set
in order and transferred to the authority will take some time.' 8 De-
spite the international community's desire for speed, the Coalition
Provisional Authority must verify that all exchanges are well-docu-
mented and that all the records are set in order.' 3 9 A clear transition
will ensure that the Iraqi people retain the benefits of the Oil-for-Food
Program that they have not yet received, and that the Iraqi govern-
ment, when it is formed, will have a firm foundation upon which to
rest. Iraq, and the international community as a whole, have reached
a crucial turning point. Should the authority turn Iraq over to the
Iraqis, the oil companies may lose some of their influence. On the
other hand, should the authority remain, or institute a sham govern-
ment, they only continue the legacy of thinly-veiled "people control"
that began at the turn of the century with international interest in oil.
136 Id. (arguing that oil will sell at a lower value because of a perceived risk by the
buyer, and there may actually be a difficulty in finding buyers for Iraqi oil that
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